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Ain’t No Taxing High Enough: Using Land 
Value Taxation to Combat the Nation’s 
Rental Affordability Crisis 
Robert Stephen Earnest† 
Introduction 
Across the United States, cities are losing affordable rental 
housing1 at an alarming rate.2 In some of the nation’s fastest-
growing areas, rental rates have soared, while rental vacancies 
have reached a historic low.3 At the same time, housing prices are 
rising nearly twice as fast as inflation and wage growth, keeping 
homeownership out of reach for many renters.4 As a result, a large 
and growing number of renters across the country are denied a 
stable place to live, which research consistently demonstrates is 
essential for creating safe and healthy communities.5 However, not 
all renters are affected equally; the effects of rising rental rates are 
disproportionately felt by low-income earners.6 Indeed, a renter 
 
 †. J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. I extend my most 
sincere gratitude to Professor Ann Burkhart for her advice and guidance throughout 
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Law and Inequality for their diligent editing and insightful feedback; to my family 
for their constant love and support during these past twenty-six years of my life; and 
to my incredible wife, Rachael, without whom I would not have survived law school.  
 1. It is widely accepted that for housing to be “affordable,” housing costs should 
not exceed 30% of household income. For an overview of the 30% of income standard, 
see CHRISTOPHER HERBERT, ALEXANDER HERMANN & DANIEL MCCUE, JOINT CTR. 
FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., MEASURING HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: ASSESSING 
THE 30 PERCENT OF INCOME STANDARD  2–4 (2018). 
 2. See STEVE GUGGENMOS & KEVIN BURKE, FREDDIE MAC MULTIFAMILY RES. 
CTR., DIMINISHING AFFORDABILITY – INESCAPABLE: QUANTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN POPULATION GROWTH AND MULTIFAMILY RENTAL AFFORDABILITY 2 (2019) 
(finding that nearly 86% of metro areas saw a reduction in affordable housing 
between 2010 and 2017). 
 3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2019, at 1–4 (Marcia Fernald ed., 2019) [hereinafter STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2019]. 
 4. See id. at 4. 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHERE WE LIVE MATTERS FOR 
OUR HEALTH: THE LINKS BETWEEN HOUSING AND HEALTH 5 (2008) (discussing the 
relationship between affordable housing and health). 
 6. Low-income is defined as earning 80% or less of the median income for a 
given metro area (AMI). Income Limits, URB. HOMESTEADING ASSISTANCE BD., 
https://uhab.org/resource/2020-income-limits/ [perma.cc/THE7-4JBY]. 
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working full-time and earning a minimum wage cannot afford a 
two-bedroom apartment—let alone a single-family home—in any 
one of the nation’s more than three thousand counties.7 But low-
income earners are not alone in experiencing rental housing 
affordability issues: middle-income earners8 are increasingly 
finding themselves priced out of communities as well.9 
Not only does rental affordability affect individuals differently 
based on income, but it also varies across cities, suburbs, small 
towns, and rural areas. For instance, over the past decade, thriving 
urban centers like Austin, San Francisco, and Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul have struggled to add enough affordable units for low- and 
middle-income renter households to keep pace with demand,10 while 
New Orleans lost almost two-hundred such units between 
September 2018 and August 2019.11 However, this is not to say that 
rural areas are unaffected by the affordable rental housing crisis: 
roughly one quarter of the nation’s most rural areas have seen a 
significant increase in the percentage of residents sending more 
than half of their income to their landlords.12 
The number of households and regions affected by rising rental 
rates, combined with the detrimental impact of high housing prices 
 
 7. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2 (2019). 
 8. Middle-income is understood as earning above 120% of AMI. Income Limits, 
supra note 6. 
 9. JENNY SCHUETZ, COST, CROWDING, OR COMMUTING? HOUSING STRESS ON THE 
MIDDLE CLASS, BROOKINGS INST. (May 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/cost-crowding-or-commuting-housing-stress-on-the-middle-class/ 
[perma.cc/2LKK-TUES]. 
 10. In Austin, cost-burden rates for low- and middle-income renter households 
increased from 9% in 2000 to 25% in 2015. CARL HEDMAN, DIANA ELLIOTT, TANAYA 
SRINI & SHIVA KOORAGAYALA, URB. INST., AUSTIN AND THE STATE OF LOW- AND 
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING 18 (2017). Since 2010, San Francisco has seen a combined 
31% decrease in housing for low- and middle-income earners. Ida Mojadad, 
Affordable Housing Lags Far Behind High-Income Housing, Report Shows, SF 
WEEKLY (Oct. 17, 2019), https://sfweekly.com/news/affordable-housing-jobs-link/ 
[perma.cc/WD2L-Y8PH]. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2017, the Minneapolis-
Saint Paul metro area added only 9,000 new affordable units, which is well below 
the 52,570 units that were demanded. METRO. COUNCIL, AT A LOSS: AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING PRODUCTION IN 2017 3 (2019). 
 11. James Brasuell, Affordable Housing Losing Ground in New Orleans, 
PLANETIZEN (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.planetizen.com/news/2019/10/106468-
affordable-housing-losing-ground-new-orleans [perma.cc/WD45-4APL]. 
 12. Patrick Sisson, The Rent’s ‘Too Damn High’ in Rural America, Too, CURBED 
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/4/2/18291233/rent-apartment-rural-
affordable-housing [perma.cc/7XCL-SVZ7]. 
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on homelessness,13 health outcomes,14 and income inequality,15 
have sparked a nationwide conversation about the affordable 
housing crisis and have prompted government intervention. At the 
federal level, lawmakers have proposed a host of reforms, including 
modifications to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program16 and increased investment in the federal Housing Trust 
Fund.17 State and municipal governments have also taken action to 
make housing more affordable. For example, in 2019, the City of 
Minneapolis amended its zoning ordinance to allow duplexes and 
triplexes on lots previously zoned exclusively for single-family use.18 
Oregon followed suit by prohibiting single-family zoning in cities 
with populations of 25,000 or more.19 Similarly, the City of Dallas 
created an accessory dwelling unit overlay district making it legal 
for homeowners to rent out small units built on their property,20 
while San Diego County has taken steps to streamline its building 
permitting process, thereby increasing the rate at which new rental 
 
 13. KATHLEEN MCCORMICK, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, HOUSING THE 
HOMELESS 21 (2018) (“The main reason people become homeless today . . . is because 
they cannot find housing they can afford.”). 
 14. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 5, at 5. 
 15. See Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share: 
Accumulation or Scarcity?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2015, at 
1, 51 (finding that rising housing costs negatively affect the distribution of income). 
 16. The LIHTC incentivizes property owners to construct affordable rental units 
for low- and middle-income tenants by reducing the tax burden on the property 
subject to the credit. JILL KHADDURI, CARISSA CLIMACO & KIMBERLY BURNETT, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 
PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? 1 (2012). Under current law, the value of 
LIHTC properties is set at a below-market rate for thirty years. Id. at 6–7. However, 
in some cases, owners can pursue a qualified contract option, which allows them to 
convert the units to market rate after fifteen years. Id. at 7. The Save Affordable 
Housing Act (SAHA) would repeal the qualified contract option. See Senators Young 
and Wyden Introduce Legislation to Protect Affordable Housing, U.S. SENATOR TODD 
YOUNG OF INDIANA (June 25, 2019), https://www.young.senate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/senators-young-and-wyden-introduce-legislation-to-protect-affordable-
housing [perma.cc/UM8A-L24K] (discussing the SAHA). 
 17. See, e.g., Diana Budds, Elizabeth Warren Doubles Down on Affordable 
Housing Legislation, CURBED (Dec. 11, 2018), https://archive.curbed.com/ 
2018/12/11/18136027/elizabeth-warren-affordable-housing-bill [perma.cc/6QUN-
GNWS] (discussing a bill that would allot an additional $450 billion to the federal 
Housing Trust Fund, which is used to develop new affordable rental units). 
 18. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 521.10(1) (2020). For a general discussion of 
the Minneapolis zoning reform, which was the first of its kind in the nation, see Erick 
Trickey, How Minneapolis Freed Itself from the Stranglehold of Single-Family 
Homes, POLITICO (July 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2019/07/11/housing-crisis-single-family-homes-policy-227265 [perma.cc/3H89-
D5EL]. 
 19. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.758 (2019). 
 20. DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 51A-4.510 (2018). 
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housing is built.21 Underlying these reforms is the intuitive 
principle that more housing means lower housing costs. Ultimately, 
however, even though these reforms may be necessary to bolster 
new housing development, they may not be sufficient.22 
What may be sufficient is a centuries-old tax idea known as 
land value taxation, which municipal governments have used 
recently as a means to raise revenue without increasing taxes for 
homeowners.23 Land value taxation, briefly, is a tax regime that 
assesses higher tax rates on land values than on building values. 
What makes it attractive in the affordable housing context is its 
ability to incentivize housing development and, thus, lead to higher 
levels of housing construction.24 Of course, the goal of this Note is 
not to suggest that land value taxation is a panacea for our nation’s 
affordable housing woes, but rather to introduce it as a tool worthy 
of serious consideration. To demonstrate this claim, this Note 
begins by briefly discussing the recent origins and impacts of the 
widening gap between supply of—and demand for—affordable 
rental housing. Part I concludes that one of the main drivers of high 
housing costs is a shortage of supply and argues that the single-rate 
property tax system is partly responsible for this supply shortage. 
Part II posits land value taxation as an alternative to this system. 
Part III.A argues that land value taxation can augment federal, 
state, and local efforts to produce more affordable housing. Part 
III.B addresses how three potentially adverse consequences of 
enacting a land value tax could be mitigated. 
 
 21. Charles T. Clark, County Looks to Streamline Permit Process to Bolster 
Housing, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 24, 2019), https://www.sandiego 
uniontribune.com/news/politics/story/2019-07-24/county-to-look-bolstering-housing-
by-streamlining-discretionary-permit-process [perma.cc/NCT7-HZRD]. 
 22. For example, recent evidence shows that “upzoning”—the practice of 
changing a zoning code to allow for taller and/or denser construction—may not be as 
effective at encouraging development as its proponents argue. See Yonah Freemark, 
Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning Reform on Property Values and Housing 
Construction, 56 URB. AFF. REV. 759, 783 (2020) (finding that upzoning had no effect 
on housing supply). 
 23. The tax was most recently enacted in Millbourne, Pennsylvania, to striking 
effect: two of the city’s largest parcels, formerly unused, have since come under 
development, while homeowners have seen their property tax bills slashed by nearly 
a third. J. Brian Charles, Leaning on the Land, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-land-tax.html [perma.cc/3N5E-
XDKY]. 
 24. See infra Part II.A; Mason Gaffney, Tax Reform to Release Land, in LAND-
VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, 75–
76 (Kenneth C. Wenzer ed., 1999) (demonstrating that the single-rate property tax 
stands as a formidable obstacle to new housing construction). 
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I. Why Has Rental Housing Become So Unaffordable? 
While the current affordable rental housing crisis is one of the 
worst in recent memory, “[t]he mismatch between the number of 
people needing homes and the amount of affordable housing 
available [is not] unique to this moment in history . . . .”25 In fact, to 
some degree, the United States rental market has always struggled 
to supply housing at affordable rates.26 However, commentators and 
scholars generally agree that the current affordability crisis began 
when the subprime mortgage crisis hit in 2007, resulting in nearly 
three million homeowners losing their homes to foreclosure.27 These 
former owner-occupants flocked to an already-crowded rental 
market, exacerbating the problems caused by a shortage of 
affordable rental housing.28 This, in turn, caused the number of 
cost-burdened renter households—those who spend at least 30 
percent of their monthly income on rent—to drastically increase, as 
former homeowners competed with lower-income renters for 
affordable units.29 Indeed, in 2016, nearly half of renters were cost-
burdened compared to 20 percent in 1960.30 While the overall 
number and percentage of cost-burdened households has 
marginally decreased since the foreclosure crisis of the late 2000s, 
homeowners have accounted for much of this reduction.31 Yet this 
does not mean that homeownership has become less expensive: 
overall burden rates have dropped primarily because homeowners 
have either refinanced into lower-cost mortgages, benefited from 
income growth, or left homeownership altogether.32 Moreover, due 
to today’s tighter mortgage underwriting practices,33 exchanging 
 
 25. Bryce Covert, The Deep, Uniquely American Roots of Our Affordable-Housing 
Crisis, THE NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/give-us-
shelter/ [perma.cc/6BBZ-7MTM]. 
 26. See id. (chronicling the history of affordable housing in the United States). 
 27. Id.; see also Gregg Colburn & Ryan Allen, Rent Burden and the Great 
Recession in the USA, 55 URB. STUD. 226, 241 (2018) (finding that “rent burden has 
unambiguously increased post-recession”). 
 28. Covert, supra note 25. 
 29. Id. 
 30. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31. Moreover, “[t]he 
share of renter households that were severely rent burdened—spending 50 percent 
or more of monthly income on rent—increased by 42 percent between 2001 and 2015, 
to 17 percent.” PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AMERICAN FAMILIES FACE A GROWING 
RENT BURDEN 4 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 31. In 2017, “[t]he number of cost-burdened owners stood at 17.3 million[,]” or 
22.5%. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 3. For example, the Federal Housing Administration, which insures 
mortgages for riskier borrowers, has adopted a rule that will subject roughly 40,000 
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monthly rent for a monthly mortgage payment is not an option for 
a substantial majority of tenants, and thus their housing options 
largely remain limited to apartment buildings.34 As a result, “cost-
burdened renters now outnumber cost-burdened homeowners by 
more than 3 million.”35 
At the same time, for a variety of reasons, the United States’ 
large renter population continues to grow larger.36 Between 2006 
and 2016, in roughly a quarter of the nation’s one hundred largest 
cities, the population changed from homeowner- to renter-
majority.37 During the same time, eleven of the largest cities in the 
United States saw double-digit growth in the number of renters, 
while seven of those cities saw renter growth exceeding 20 
percent.38 Renter growth has also accelerated in mid-sized cities 
like Denver, Nashville, and Charlotte, which are among the fastest-
growing rental markets in the nation.39 Unsurprisingly, the 
increased demand for rental housing has caused rental markets to 
tighten even further, leading to historically low vacancy rates and 
 
to 50,000 loans per year to manual review. Under the previous rule, those loans 
would have been approved automatically. Paul Davidson, Fewer First-Time Home 
Buyers Likely to Qualify for Mortgages Under Tougher FHA Standards, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/03/25/home-loans-
fewer-first-timers-get-mortgages-under-tough-standards/3271050002/ 
[perma.cc/AF98-6WGL]. 
 34. Manufactured homes—also called mobile homes—have been, and continue to 
be, a popular, low-cost option for individuals who cannot afford or do not desire to 
purchase site-built homes. See Ann M. Burkhart, Bringing Manufactured Housing 
into the Real Estate Finance System, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 428 (2010) (observing that 
“[u]p to two-thirds of the new affordable homes built each year have been 
manufactured”). However, there are currently multiple factors that make 
manufactured housing a less viable alternative to rental housing. See id. at 441–42 
(discussing how the legal characterization of manufactured homes as personal 
property in a majority of states has led to reduced credit availability for 
manufactured home purchases). See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers 
to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. LAW. 233 (2016) (discussing the land use 
obstacles to manufactured housing construction). 
 35. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 4. 
 36. See id. at 3 (“[E]stimates [of renter households] show[ed] an uptick in early 
2019, in keeping with Joint Center projections of about 400,000 net new renter 
households annually over the coming decade.”). 
 37. Balazs Szekely, Renters Became the Majority Population in 22 Big US Cities, 
RENTCAFE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.rentcafe.com/blog/rental-market/market-
snapshots/change-renter-vs-owner-population-2006-2016/ [perma.cc/BY69-CR7H]. 
 38. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & BRIAN KARFUNKEL, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. & CAPITAL 
ONE, RENTING IN AMERICA’S LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2016). 
 39. Diana Olick, High Rents Trickle Down to Smaller Cities, CNBC (Feb. 20, 
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/19/high-rents-trickle-down-to-smaller-
cities.html [perma.cc/5FRH-AGMV]. 
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higher rents.40 According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Housing 
Vacancy Survey, the national vacancy rate for rental units in early 
2019 was 6.9 percent, the lowest it has been since 1986,41 while 
“overall rents [have risen] at . . . twice the pace of overall 
inflation.”42 
However, unlike previous trends, large cities like Atlanta and 
Phoenix are generally not the areas experiencing the most drastic 
rent increases; smaller cities like Madison, Alabama and Maryland 
Heights, Missouri have seen their rental rates increase by between 
6 and 7 percent each year.43 And even though it tends to be the case 
that individuals living in cities with higher costs of living tend to 
have higher incomes,44 a majority of rental units in United States 
metro areas continue to remain unaffordable to the average metro 
renter.45 
Demand has certainly contributed to growing rental housing 
unaffordability, as changing household formation, steady job 
growth, and progressively lower turnover rates combine to drive 
rental rates upwards.46 Rising home prices also play an important 
role by deterring potential homebuyers from entering the housing 
market.47 Yet research shows that if this increased demand had 
been matched by increased housing construction, rental rates would 
generally be much lower than they currently are.48 However, even 
 
 40. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 27. Rent growth for 
multifamily apartments in 150 metro areas increased from 2.6% in the first quarter 
of 2018 to 3.3% in the first quarter of 2019. Id. Furthermore, rent growth for single-
family units increased from 2.7% in the first quarter of 2018 to 3.2% in January 2019. 
Id. 
 41. Id. at 38. In some places, such as the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metro area, 
rental vacancy rates are as low as 2 percent. Jim Buchta, Low Vacancy Rates Make 
It Tough for Twin Cities Apartment Renters, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.startribune.com/low-vacancy-rates-make-it-tough-for-twin-cities-
apartment-renters/558031542/ [perma.cc/K8RL-Y3GC]. 
 42. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 4. 
 43. See Chris Salviati, November 2019 Rent Report, APARTMENT LIST (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/november-2019-rent-report/ 
[perma.cc/TU5U-ND4Q] (city data available in table of recent rent estimates). 
 44. GOULD ELLEN & KARFUNKEL, supra note 38, at 15, 18. 
 45. Id. at 18. 
 46. Olick, supra note 39. 
 47. Laura Kusisto, More Renters Giving Up on Buying a Home, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-renters-give-up-on-buying-a-home-
1522773685 [perma.cc/L8FE-8SFQ]. 
 48. See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CALIFORNIA’S HIGH 
HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 12 (2015) (“[O]ur analysis suggests 
that . . . if a county with a home building rate in the bottom fifth of all counties 
during the 2000s had instead been among the top fifth, its median home prices in 
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though the stock of new housing has been slowly but steadily 
increasing,49 demand has continued to outpace supply in all but 
three markets across the United States.50 Thus, the current 
affordable rental housing crisis is largely a consequence of there 
simply not being enough units available for the renters who seek 
them.51 
Multiple factors help to explain this supply problem. Labor 
shortages in the residential construction sector, for instance, have 
both increased the price of labor and prolonged development 
schedules, making construction more costly and more time-
consuming.52 Hefty development fees also impose onerous burdens 
on housing production.53 Indeed, one study found that development 
fees for multifamily housing complexes in Fremont, California 
totaled nearly $75,000 per unit.54 Likewise, land use regulations, 
such as building codes and zoning ordinances, prevent units from 
being built in areas where they otherwise would be.55 When demand 
 
2010 would have been roughly 25 percent lower.”); STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 
2019, supra note 3, at 12 (“To meet [robust demand for rental units and starter 
homes], the supply of . . . housing will have to increase significantly.”). 
 49. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 1 (observing that 
“additions to the housing stock have grown at an average annual rate of . . . 10 
percent”). 
 50. Julia Falcon, Apartment Supply Exceeds Demand in Only 3 U.S. Markets, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/50205-
apartment-supply-exceeds-demand-in-only-3-us-markets/ [perma.cc/TJM2-H6DU]. 
 51. While many, if not most, commentators and advocates agree that housing 
supply is the greatest barrier to affordability, some do not. See generally Vicki Been, 
Ingrid Gould & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and 
Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25 (2019) (arguing that more housing will not 
adequately address affordability challenges); Ron Feldman, The Affordable Housing 
Shortage: Considering the Problem, Causes and Solutions (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Banking & Policy Working Paper No. 02-2, 2002) (concluding that a 
shortage of income is largely behind the housing affordability problem). 
 52. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 2. 
 53. See, e.g., Mark Skidmore & Michael Peddle, Do Development Impact Fees 
Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?, 29 GROWTH & CHANGE 383, 392–94 
(1998) (finding that development fees in DuPage County, Illinois, reduced the rate 
of residential construction by 25%). 
 54. Sarah Mawhorter & David Garcia, It All Adds Up: The Cost of Housing 
Development Fees in Seven California Cities, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION 
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/it-all-adds-up-the-cost-of-
housing-development-fees-in-seven-california-cities/ [perma.cc/7YJV-XGV9]. 
 55. Building codes regulate the design and construction of buildings, which 
creates compliance costs and discourages developers from building additional units. 
David Listokin & David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 21, 37 
(2005). Zoning ordinances dictate how land in a particular jurisdiction can be used 
and typically impose limits on building size, height, and bulk, which further 
constrains rental housing supply. See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven 
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for housing is strong, the net effect of these obstacles is to raise land 
and housing prices.56 
However, this Note posits that another factor is also to blame 
for rental housing unaffordability: the single-rate property tax. The 
single-rate property tax is problematic because it is primarily a tax 
on building values, and because buildings are among the most 
expensive and durable capital goods that exist, a tax on building 
values is usually large and long-lasting.57 Thus, the single-rate 
property tax stands as a formidable obstacle to new housing 
construction.58 Because lack of housing supply is one of the main 
drivers of our current affordability crisis, a strong case can be made 
for reforming the single-rate property tax system to one that is more 
growth-friendly.59 Land value taxation, by simultaneously 
rewarding landowners who develop their land and punishing those 
who do not, represents such a reform. While land value taxation has 
traditionally been praised for its ability to control the effects of 
urban sprawl60 and combat urban blight,61 its ability to stimulate 
development—and thus lead to a greater housing stock—indicates 
that it may be able to reduce the pressures that demand is currently 
exerting on rental housing prices. Many state and local legislatures 
have debated enacting a land value tax; a few of them have even 
 
Saks, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 
48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 366 (2005) (finding that the substantial gap between the price 
of housing and construction costs “suggests the power of land use controls in limiting 
new construction”). 
 56. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 8. 
 57. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 75–76. 
 58. Id. 
 59. While the problems of the single-rate property tax could be solved by outright 
repealing it, “[t]he loss in revenue . . . would have to be made up with other 
taxes . . . or with massive cuts in government services.” Richard F. Dye & Richard 
W. England, The Principles and Promises of Land Value Taxation, in LAND VALUE 
TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 4 (Richard F. Dye & Richard W. 
England eds., 2009) [hereinafter Dye & England, Principles and Promises]. Thus, the 
case for reforming the single-rate property tax is stronger than the case for 
eliminating it. 
 60. See, e.g., Seong-Hoon Cho, Seung Gyu Kim & Roland K. Roberts, Measuring 
the Effects of a Land Value Tax on Land Development, 4 APPLIED SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
& POL’Y 45, 47 (2011) (“A higher tax rate on land than on land improvements . . . is 
a potential policy tool to moderate sprawl . . . .”); H. Spencer Banzhaf & Nathan 
Lavery, Can the Land Tax Help Cure Urban Sprawl? Evidence from Growth Patterns 
in Pennsylvania, 67 J. URB. ECON. 169, 177 (2010) (finding that “[a]dopting the split-
rate tax results in a 4-5% point increase per decade in the growth of the density of 
housing units for the first two decades”). 
 61. See Elaine S. Povich, Can Extra Taxes on Vacant Land Cure City Blight?, 
PEW (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state 
line/2017/03/07/can-extra-taxes-on-vacant-land-cure-city-blight [perma.cc/87N3-
46HG] (discussing a push in Hartford, Connecticut, to assess higher taxes on unused 
land so as to hasten development and reduce blight). 
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done so.62 Nevertheless, most have rejected the idea, usually citing 
concerns about its effectiveness and impact.63 However, as this Note 
argues, a land value tax can be effective at encouraging more 
housing development and thus reducing net housing costs, and 
there are ways to mitigate its potentially adverse consequences. 
Thus, state and local governments should consider using land value 
taxation in their campaigns to make housing more affordable.64 
II. Land Value Taxation: History and Description65 
The land value tax is a type of property tax. The property tax 
is one of the oldest and most widely-used revenue sources in the 
United States.66 For local governments, it is also one of the most 
important, accounting for roughly half of local tax revenue.67 
Property taxes are assessed for real property and personal property, 
but because real property is generally much more valuable than 
personal property, it provides the basis for almost all of the revenue 
 
 62. Fairhope, Alabama; Arden, Delaware; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania are 
among the cities that have enacted some variant of the land value tax. Steven C. 
Bourassa, The U.S. Experience, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 11–12. The City of Amsterdam, New York adopted land 
value taxation in 1995, but repealed it the following year before its effect could be 
observed. Id. at 12. Oregon, among other states, also briefly experimented with land 
value taxation during the latter part of the twentieth century. See generally Richard 
W. Lindholm & Roger C. Sturtevant, American Land Tax Roots: Plus 
Experimentation in Oregon, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THE PROGRESS AND POVERTY 
CENTENARY 83–94 (Richard W. Lindholm & Arthur D. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1978) 
(discussing the land value tax movement in Oregon). 
 63. See, e.g., Bourassa, supra note 62, at 16 (describing how an opponent to 
Pittsburgh’s land value tax argued it “was confusing and was causing residential 
neighborhoods to lose out at the expense of downtown interests”). 
 64. This Note’s discussion of land value taxation is confined to state and local 
governments because most legal and economic scholars agree that the federal 
government is constitutionally prohibited from assessing taxes on real property. See 
Richard D. Coe, The Legal Framework in the United States, in LAND VALUE 
TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 130 (noting that the 
federal Constitution forbids Congress from laying direct taxes and that real property 
taxes are generally assumed to be direct taxes within the meaning of the 
Constitution). But see Steven B. Cord, Legal Suggestions for Enacting a Land Value 
Tax 8–14 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper, 1999) (describing the various 
ways by which the federal government could constitutionally assess a land value 
tax). 
 65. For the purposes of this Note, I make no distinction between land value 
taxation and split-rate variants of the real property tax that tax land at a much 
higher rate than improvements. 
 66. Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 3. 
 67. See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS 88–89 (2002); see also 
Bethany P. Paquin, Chronicle of the 161-Year History of State-Imposed Property Tax 
Limitations 1 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper WP15BP1, 2015). 
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derived from property taxes.68 For real property, most jurisdictions 
use a single-rate property tax regime, under which land and 
improvements to the land, such as buildings, are taxed at the same 
rate.69 The operation of a single-rate property tax system can be 
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that a parcel 
of land is valued at $10,000 and the sole improvement to that land—
a restaurant—is valued at $20,000. If the statutory property tax 
rate is fixed at 5 percent, then the actual amount of property tax 
owed under a single-rate property tax regime would be $1,500: $500 
for the land and $1,000 for the restaurant.70 Thus, as should be clear 
from this hypothetical, the single-rate property tax “is actually two 
types of taxes[:] one upon building values, and the other upon land 
values.”71 Yet despite its reputation as a mainstay of local 
government finance, the single-rate property tax has long faced 
fierce public opposition.72 
While people generally tend to dislike taxes, the single-rate 
property tax has generated special controversy because it is 
regressive73 and can fluctuate widely from year to year.74 There are 
also relatively few ways to reduce the amount of property tax 
owed.75 The opposition to the property tax has not been confined to 
 
 68. JOYCE ERRECART, ED GERRISH & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATES 
MOVING AWAY FROM TAXES ON TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 2 (2012). Not only is 
real property generally more valuable than personal property, it also tends to 
appreciate in value over time. In contrast, personal property, like cars and boats, 
tends to lose value as it ages. This is another reason why personal property taxes 
tend to make up a relatively small percentage of total local property tax revenue. 
 69. Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 4 n.1. 
 70. This hypothetical assumes a taxable value of 100%. If a state were to instead 
mandate that a 50% assessment ratio be applied to real property, then the amount 
of property tax owed in this hypothetical would be $750: $250 for the land and $500 
for the restaurant. 
 71. Alanna Hartzok, Pennsylvania’s Success with Local Property Tax Reform: 
The Split Rate Tax, 56 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 205, 205 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 72. Ninety-five percent of voters on Debate.org voted in favor of abolishing the 
single-rate property tax. Should Property Taxes Be Abolished?, DEBATE, 
https://www.debate.org/opinions/should-property-taxes-be-abolished 
[perma.cc/2YNN-5H6U]. Indeed, the public reaction to the tax has been so hostile 
that forty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that limits local authority 
to tax property. See Paquin, supra note 67, at 3. The most well-known (and most 
influential) of these limitations is Proposition 13, the 1978 California taxpayer 
initiative that capped property taxes at 1 percent. Id. at 8. 
 73. It is regressive because low-income individuals spend a greater percentage of 
their income on housing than high-income individuals and thus are more heavily 
impacted by real property taxes. CHARLES E. GILLILAND, PROPERTY TAXES: THE 
GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 1 (2013). 
 74. Id. 
 75. In most states, veterans, the elderly, disabled individuals, and owners of 
designated residential homesteads can qualify for a partial exemption, but few 
exemptions beyond those exist. Id. at 2. 
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the public sphere either—economists have long decried the tax as 
both inefficient and inequitable: inefficient because, by taxing use, 
it discourages economic development; inequitable because it allows 
landowners to profit from a resource that derives its value from 
community rather than individual efforts.76 It was for these reasons 
that Henry George, a nineteenth-century activist and political 
economist, recommended that taxes on buildings be eliminated in 
favor of a much higher single tax on the value of unimproved land.77 
Theoretically, this tax would have to be high enough to compensate 
for the decrease in revenue caused by the elimination of the building 
tax. Thus, in the restaurant hypothetical described above, under the 
single tax regime envisioned by George, the amount of property tax 
owed would still be $1,500, but it would be derived solely from the 
value of the land. This concept, where land value is taxed at a 
different, higher rate than building value, is known as land value 
taxation. However, the modern interpretation of land value 
taxation differs from the traditional single tax version proposed by 
George, who believed that the single tax should be the only tax from 
which governments would derive their property tax revenues.78 In 
 
 76. See Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 3–4. 
 77. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF 
WEALTH: THE REMEDY (1879), available at https://tile.loc.gov/storage-
services/service/gdc/gdcscd/00/03/70/63/30/7/00037063307/00037063307.pdf 
[perma.cc/K2LY-PEP7]. While land value taxation is most famously associated with 
Henry George, the origins of the theory can be found in the works of classical 
economists John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848) 
(“[T]he existing land-tax . . . ought not to be regarded as a tax, but as a rent-charge 
in favour of the public; a portion of the rent, reserved from the beginning by the 
State, which has never belonged to or formed part of the income of the landlords, and 
should not therefore be counted to them as part of their taxation.”); ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. V (T. Nelson 
& Sons ed., 1873) (1776) (“Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary rent of 
land, are altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign, 
which . . . enables them to pay so much more than its value for the ground which 
they build their houses upon . . . Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund, 
which owes its existence to the good government of the state, should be taxed 
peculiarly, or should contribute something more than the greater part of other funds, 
towards the support of that government.”). 
 78. See GEORGE, supra note 77, at 371 (“Tax manufacturers, and the effect is to 
check manufacturing; tax improvements, and the effect is to lessen improvement; 
tax commerce, and the effect is to prevent exchange; tax capital, and the effect is to 
drive it away. But the whole value of land may be taken in taxation, and the only 
effect will be to stimulate industry, to open new opportunities to capital, and to 
increase the production of wealth.”). While there are certain benefits to the single 
tax, many scholars have not given the idea serious consideration because it is 
unlikely that a state or local government, in the absence of other taxes, could raise 
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contrast, the modern interpretation of land value taxation does not 
require the total elimination of taxes on building values—taxes on 
building values are merely reduced, while taxes on land values are 
increased.79 This approach to land value taxation is known as split-
rate taxation and is the one that has been used by nearly all of the 
jurisdictions that have experimented with land value taxation.80 
Yet because the single tax and the split-rate tax are each variants 
of the land value tax, they both rest on the same theoretical 
observations. 
Two observations underlie land value tax theory. The first 
observation is that all taxes, like taxes on income and sales, 
generally operate to raise prices and discourage both production 
and consumption.81 When a government assesses a tax on a good, 
the cost of producing that good increases by the amount of the tax.82 
Therefore, in order for suppliers to keep consumer purchases at pre-
tax levels, the price of the good supplied must fall by the amount of 
the tax.83 However, as a matter of theory and practice, this result 
will not occur because at a lower price, suppliers will see their 
profits decrease and will be unwilling to supply the good 
demanded.84 Thus, because suppliers control the amount of the good 
they are willing to supply, they will respond to taxes by passing 
most of the cost of the tax onto consumers.85 In this way, taxes 
operate to raise prices. Naturally, if the price of a good increases, 
some consumers will purchase less of it.86 Accordingly, suppliers 
 
land taxes high enough to continue funding government services at their present 
level without violating the Constitution. See generally Eric Kades, Drawing the Line 
Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader 
Application, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 189 (2002) (discussing how taxation may be 
deemed an unconstitutional taking of private property if it unduly burdens 
individual property interests). 
 79. See generally Vernon I. Saunders, In Defense of the Two-Rate Property Tax, 
in LAND-VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE, supra note 24, at 269–76 (describing the use of land value taxation 
throughout the twentieth century). 
 80. For example, all of the cities in Pennsylvania that had enacted a land value 
tax continued to tax building values, albeit at a significantly lower rate than land 
values. For a complete list of these cities and the rates imposed, see Dye & England, 
Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 15. 
 81. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Simple Analytics of Land Value 
Taxation, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE, supra note 
59, at 58 [hereinafter Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics]; see also GEORGE, supra 
note 77, at 371. 
 82. See Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 56. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 58. 
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will respond to lower consumer demand by producing less of the 
good.87 Yet because these consumers were willing to purchase the 
good at its previous price, and because the actual cost of producing 
the good has not changed, it should be produced and consumed.88 
Thus, taxes generally lead to higher prices and, as a result, lower 
levels of production and consumption. The same analysis applies to 
taxes on building values, which have the effect of reducing 
construction levels and raising rents. This is because buildings are 
part of a firm’s production costs. Thus, unless the economic benefits 
of improving a parcel of land outweigh the costs associated with an 
increased tax burden, a landowner will only improve their land 
until the point where it no longer becomes economically feasible—
where they can no longer raise rents high enough to pay the tax—
or decide not to build on the land at all, thereby avoiding the tax 
altogether. Thus, the single-rate property tax—at least in part—
keeps the housing stock at less-than optimal levels by creating a 
disincentive to build. 
The second observation is that there are two fundamental 
differences between land and other objects that render the first 
observation inapplicable to land. First, whereas producers can 
respond to high taxes by merely decreasing the amount of the goods 
they produce, higher taxes cannot diminish the supply of land 
because land is fixed in quantity.89 Therefore, although a tax on 
land value would require landowners to pay more, “it gives them no 
power to obtain more for the use of their land, as it in no way tends 
to reduce the supply of land.”90 It is precisely this ability to reduce 
supply that gives suppliers the power to pass taxes onto consumers 
in the first place. However, because the supply of land cannot be 
reduced, landowners cannot pass taxes on their land to tenants. 
Second, land is immobile; unlike capital, it cannot be relocated to a 
different jurisdiction to evade tax authorities.91 Thus, taxes on land 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Economists use the term “deadweight loss” to describe this loss in economic 
welfare. Id. 
 89. Although this statement is largely true, it is not completely true, as there are 
a few instances where land has been “created.” For instance, “the Back Bay 
neighborhood in Boston was created by filling the tidewater flats of the Charles River 
over a 25-year period beginning in 1857.” Id. at 56 n.4. Likewise, much of the land 
in the Streeterville neighborhood in Chicago was created through a combination of 
landfilling and natural accretion. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 
Contested Shore: Property Rights in Reclaimed Land and the Battle for Streeterville, 
107 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2015). 
 90. GEORGE, supra note 77, at 373. 
 91. Arguably, this is true about buildings, too, but whereas buildings can be 
reduced in size or demolished completely, land cannot. 
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are unavoidable: every landowner would be required to register 
their land and pay the tax on their land holdings. Together, these 
two theoretical observations imply that the single-rate property tax 
regime unduly burdens housing construction and that a switch to 
land value taxation would free up more land for development and 
put land to its best and highest possible use without harming 
renters. 
III. Using Land Value Taxation to Increase Affordability 
A. How Land Value Taxation Can Create More Affordable 
Rental Housing 
Conventional property taxes discourage landowners from 
improving their land by causing their taxes to rise.92 Because land 
value taxation shifts most or all of the tax on improvements onto 
land, landowners would be able to add more value to their land 
without any or with insignificant tax increases, which reduces the 
average tax rate on their property.93 In cities where demand is 
strong, among the main reasons for the lack of affordable rental 
housing is that there are not enough rental units available to 
accommodate demand, not enough moderately-priced homes into 
which renters can move, or some combination of the two.94 Thus, 
switching to a land value tax system could help to spur development 
in high-demand areas so as to increase the available rental housing 
stock. 
The incentive effects of land value taxation can be 
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that there are 
two residential properties, each in a different part of the city. One 
is a small, single-family house built on a large lot and located in a 
high-valued neighborhood near the city’s central business district; 
the other is a much larger multifamily rental housing unit built in 
a neighborhood much further away from the city’s core where 
properties are assessed at lower values. Suppose also that the land 
and building values of the single-family house are each $200,000, 
while the multifamily unit has land valued at $50,000 and 
improvements valued at $350,000. Under a single-rate property tax 
 
 92. See discussion supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text; see also Arthur P. 
Becker, Principles of Taxing Land and Buildings for Economic Development, in LAND 
AND BUILDING TAXES 12 (1969). 
 93. Id. at 25; see also TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 13 (“Building more units on the 
same plot of land allows a developer to spread land costs across more units, lessening 
the impact of land costs on the cost of each unit. This is because land costs are fixed 
and do not increase if a developer builds additional units.”). 
 94. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 11, 27. 
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regime, both parties pay the same amount of tax, as both have a 
total assessed value of $400,000. However, under a land value tax 
regime, where the tax on building values is eliminated or 
significantly reduced, that would no longer be the case. The tax 
burdens of the two properties would not be equally shared. This is 
because to receive a similar amount of tax revenue, the city would 
have to increase the tax rate on land values to make up for the 
reduced tax on building values.95 Thus, the multifamily unit 
property would end up paying a lower share of total collections, 
while the underused land in the higher-valued neighborhood would 
see its tax share increase. 
Not only does this result seem intuitively more fair, as lands—
in contrast to building values—are created by community efforts, 
not individual ones, it also provides an economic incentive for 
owners of higher-valued but vacant or underused land to develop 
that land beyond its present use.96 It incentivizes development of 
underused land by means of both stick (the tax on land value) and 
carrot (the absence of tax on building values), rewarding both the 
construction of new buildings and the renovation of old ones. Vacant 
lots acquire new buildings, as owners either ramp up development 
to meet a higher tax burden or sell to someone else who will improve 
it. In the United States, on average, 17 percent of large cities’ land 
area is considered to be vacant or underdeveloped,97 and many of 
these cities have the highest rents and lowest vacancy rates.98 The 
incentive effects of land value taxation would likely be most 
powerful in these cities because land values tend to be the highest 
in urban areas.99 Thus, in the hypothetical described above, because 
the tax on land values would increase under a land value tax 
regime, the owner of the single-family property would have much 
 
 95. However, even if the city did not raise rates high enough to receive the same 
amount in revenue, the land tax on the single-family property would still be much 
higher than the land on the multifamily property, simply because the former is more 
valuable than the latter. 
 96. Harold S. Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing, 48 YALE 
L.J. 240, 245 (1938). 
 97. Galen D. Newman, Ann O’M. Bowman, Ryan Jung Lee & Boah Kim, A 
Current Inventory of Vacant Urban Land in America, 21 J. URB. DESIGN 302, 311 
(2016). 
 98. A study conducted by PropertyShark and Yardi Matrix found that Dallas, 
Las Vegas, Austin, San Antonio, Phoenix, Minneapolis, and Atlanta were among the 
top ten cities in terms of the total vacant land area in their commercial business 
districts. To view the results of this study, visit https://www.commercialcafe.com/ 
blog/study-development-vacant-land-major-us-cbd/ [perma.cc/7Y87-8796]. 
 99. Buttenheim, supra note 96, at 241 (observing that “[w]here population 
concentrates, the demand for land is greater than for equally advantageous sites 
where population is sparse”). 
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more of an incentive to redevelop the home as a duplex or other 
multiple-family property, which would add more units to the city’s 
rental housing stock.100 
Land value taxation not only provides a powerful economic 
incentive for landlords to build more housing; by reducing or 
removing building taxes, it encourages greater intensity of land use, 
and so is more favorable to apartment construction than 
homebuilding.101 In contrast, single-rate property taxation tends to 
favor larger parcels and thus discourages vertical construction.102 
This is because tall buildings are more costly to construct than short 
buildings, which makes them more valuable for assessment 
purposes.103 As developers build skywards, they encounter 
increasing capital costs resulting in part from higher taxes.104 
Conversely, “horizontal spread enjoys decreasing capital 
costs . . . and saves on capital by consuming more land.”105 This 
forced demand for land in part explains the “sprawling” nature of 
so many American cities.106 Accordingly, assessing a higher tax rate 
on land values and reducing the rate on building values would cause 
developers to substitute capital for land and thus would very likely 
lead to more construction of rental housing. 
Because of its depressing effects on land price, a switch to a 
land value tax regime would also help to curb speculation in land 
markets. Land speculation occurs when individuals buy or sell land 
with the expectation of profiting from the transaction.107 Land 
speculation not only raises land prices, but also removes land from 
the market that could otherwise have been put to productive use.108 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 89. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Construction of tall buildings is generally more expensive than construction 
of short buildings “because of their need for sophisticated foundations, structural 
systems to carry high wind loads, and high-tech mechanical, electrical, elevator, and 
fire-resistant systems.” Mir M. Ali & Kheir Al-Kodmany, Tall Buildings and Urban 
Habitat in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective, 2 BUILDINGS 384, 386 (2012). 
 104. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 76. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (observing that “[i]n time[, building taxes] also lead[] to urban 
expansion”). Another one of the main contributors to urban sprawl has been and 
continues to be single-family zoning because of its general prohibition on vertical 
development. See id.; see also Trickey, supra note 18. 
 107. Speculation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 108. Speculation in land was one of the main drivers of the U.S. housing price 
boom between 2000 and 2006. Charles G. Nathanson & Eric Zwick, Arrested 
Development: Theory and Evidence of Supply Speculation in the Housing Market, 73 
J. FIN. 2587, 2623 (2018). For example, in Las Vegas, which has a relatively large 
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The single-rate property tax system, by keeping landholding costs 
relatively low, makes it economically feasible for speculators to buy 
up land and await a rise in its value without making any 
improvements. Under a land value tax regime, however, 
speculation would be less possible. This is because shifting a larger 
tax burden onto land would have the effect of lowering land prices 
by making land less attractive as an investment vehicle—more 
owners would sell land not to make a profit but to relieve 
themselves of a tax liability. Therefore, because the use (as opposed 
to the ownership) of land would primarily have economic value, the 
costs to many owners of holding land in speculation would simply 
become too onerous to justify continued ownership or 
nondevelopment.109 In addition to its arresting effects on 
construction, the single-rate property tax system makes rental 
housing less affordable because it allows landlords to shift their 
taxes onto their tenants, resulting in higher rents.110 
However, under a land value tax regime, this shifting would 
not occur because the land is fixed in supply.111 Landlords could not 
raise the price of their land in response to a higher land tax because 
at a higher price, less land would be demanded, which would result 
in an excess supply of land and downward pressure on the cost of 
land. Thus, a higher tax on land values is “borne entirely by 
landowners” and therefore would not raise rents.112 On the 
contrary, higher land taxes would lead to lower land prices, which 
would cause rents to fall and thus would further aid in making 
rental housing more affordable.113 
Underlying the previous analysis are two assumptions about 
landlord behavior: that land value taxation will effect the timing of 
 
supply of undeveloped land, speculation in the land markets caused land prices to 
quadruple between 2000 and 2006, rising from $150,000 per acre to roughly $700,000 
per acre. Id. at 2590. 
 109. Harry G. Brown, Land Speculation and Land-Value Taxation, in LAND-
VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, 
supra note 24, at 46, 56 (“[L]and-value taxation, resting equally on land whether 
used or unused, must discourage [land speculation]”). 
 110. WALTER A. MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 100 (1955) (finding that while 
building taxes on owner-occupied property must be paid by the owner, 
“[w]here . . . the property is occupied by a tenant, he may pay all or any part of a 
higher house tax through higher rents”). However, in some states, like Minnesota, 
certain tenants are able to claim a refund for all or at least a part of this amount. 
See MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX AS A PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTIAL 
RENT 1 (2005) (describing Minnesota’s Property Tax Refund Program). 
 111. See discussion supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 112. Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 57. 
 113. See id. 
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landlords’ decisions to develop and that they will respond by 
building residential, as opposed to mainly commercial, structures. 
i. More Landowners Will Improve Their Land 
The first assumption is that land value taxation will affect the 
timing of development, meaning that landlords will actually 
respond to the tax by improving their land. While some 
commentators are skeptical that this would be the case,114 empirical 
evidence from Australia and the United States, while very limited, 
does show that greater construction activity tends to follow when 
higher land taxes are assessed. For example, in Australia, from 
1921 to 1923, while only 7 percent of the municipalities in the state 
of Victoria levied a tax only on land values, they were responsible 
for nearly half of all new housing construction in that state,115 a 
finding which is made all the more significant by the fact that only 
16 percent of the state’s population lived in those areas.116 Likewise, 
from 1921 to 1940, in South Australia, housing construction was 
consistently more remarkable in the areas that used land value 
taxation than in the areas that taxed land and building values at 
equal rates.117 In general, across Australia, the states with a higher 
number of municipalities using land value taxation generally had 
higher residential building activity levels. In contrast, Tasmania, 
where land value taxation was not practiced at all, had the 
lowest.118 While additional factors, such as population growth, help 
to explain these trends, the relationship between land value 
taxation and building activity is significant and consistent enough 
to suggest that the former was a central influence on the latter. 
In comparison with Australia, the adoption of land value 
taxation in the United States has been less widespread—almost all 
of the experience with it has been in Pennsylvania and Hawaii—
and thus, the data on its effects are even more limited.119 
Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the tax’s enactment in 
 
 114. See id. at 71. 
 115. Saunders, supra note 79, at 272. Moreover, “[f]rom 1954 to 1958, the 19 
percent of municipalities that used [land value taxation] accounted for 62 percent of 
new home construction” while the five municipalities that switched to land value 
taxation in 1958 saw a 34 percent greater increase in construction over the next four 
years than the nearby areas that continued to tax building values. Id. 
 116. E.J. Craigie, Australia, in LAND VALUE TAXATION AROUND THE WORLD 22 
(Harry G. Brown ed., 1955). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 11. Even though other states and cities have 
experimented with land value taxation at varying points throughout time, little to 
no data for them exists. 
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those jurisdictions was generally followed by higher levels of 
development. The most famous example of the land value tax in the 
United States is the one adopted in 1913 by the City of Pittsburgh, 
which was required by Pennsylvania law to assess a lower tax rate 
on building values than on land values.120 After expanding its tax 
on land values in 1979 to about five times the one on building 
values, the City saw a 70 percent increase in annual building permit 
values in the decade following the expansion.121 In contrast, permit 
values in thirteen other major Rust Belt cities that did not assess a 
land value tax (including Cincinnati, Detroit, and Buffalo) dropped 
significantly during the same time period.122 Likewise, Oil City, 
Pennsylvania saw a 58 percent increase in new construction activity 
in the first three years after it adopted a land value tax compared 
to the three years preceding the adoption.123 Harrisburg, once 
considered the most economically distressed city in the United 
States, also benefited greatly from land value taxation: its total 
number of vacant buildings decreased from over four thousand in 
1982 to five hundred in 1994.124 Stephen Reed, the mayor of 
Harrisburg at the time, directly attributed its success to the City’s 
adoption of the land value tax.125 However, one of the primary 
reasons for why these cities responded so favorably is because there 
was high demand for improvements. In a few other Pennsylvania 
cities, like Clairton, land value taxation failed to bring about new 
development because the demand was simply absent.126 Without 
 
 120. Specifically, the law required all “second-class cities,” of which Pittsburgh 
was one, to provide “for gradual increases in the land tax rate and gradual reductions 
in the improvement tax rate over a period of 12 years.” Id. at 12. 
 121. Hartzok, supra note 71, at 208. Despite this documented success, support for 
the tax began to wane after a property assessment in Allegheny County in 2001 led 
to significant increases in land values and tax bills for resident taxpayers. Bourassa, 
supra note 62, at 16. Even though these increases resulted from infrequent and 
inaccurate assessments and substandard rate-setting procedures, it was the tax that 
came under fire. Id. The nail in the coffin for Pittsburgh’s experimentation with land 
value taxation came when Mayor Tom Murphy, who initially supported the tax and 
was being challenged in the upcoming mayoral election, revised his position after it 
became a high-profile political issue. Id. Nonetheless, despite the abolition of the 
land value tax as a source of general revenue in Pittsburgh, the City still uses a land-
based tax to finance the Downtown Pittsburgh Business Improvement District. Id. 
 122. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Urban Land Taxation: 
The Pittsburgh Experience, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 9 (1997) [hereinafter Oates & Schwab, 
Impact of Urban Land Taxation]. 
 123. Saunders, supra note 79, at 272. 
 124. Hartzok, supra note 71, at 209–10. 
 125. Id. at 210 (quoting Mayor Reed, who stated that “[t]he two-rate system has 
been and continues to be one of the key local policies that has been factored into this 
initial economic success”). 
 126. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 23. 
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demand to exert pressure on land values, taxes generally remained 
low and thus gave landowners no real incentive to build or sell to 
someone who would.127 
Outside of Pennsylvania, the other major U.S. experience with 
land value taxation occurred in 1963 when Hawaii adopted the tax 
statewide.128 Following the enactment, the State saw a boom in 
building activity similar to the ones that occurred in Pittsburgh, Oil 
City, and Harrisburg.129 However, because the tax was primarily 
adopted as part of a larger effort to promote tourism, this boom was 
mostly in hotel building, not residential construction.130 Ultimately, 
local backlash against the new, taller construction and its rapid, 
urban transformation of Hawaii’s Waikiki Beach led the state 
legislature to rescind the law that created the tax,131 even though 
poor zoning and planning decisions were arguably more responsible 
for the character change than land value taxation per se.132 Yet, in 
many ways, this backlash was a testament to land value taxation’s 
success at encouraging development, not its failure. 
ii. More Residential Structures Will Be Built 
The other assumption underlying this analysis is that owners 
of vacant or underdeveloped land would generally respond to higher 
land taxes by building more residential structures than commercial 
structures. Of course, this does not necessarily have to be the case. 
Unlike zoning ordinances and building codes, real estate taxes 
cannot require or prohibit specific land uses, but can only provide 
economic incentives. Indeed, the Pittsburgh construction boom was 
largely in commercial building activity; there was only a slight 
increase in residential construction.133 Likewise, as was previously 
mentioned, most of the new development in Hawaii came from the 
hotel building sector.134 
 
 127. Cf. Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 56 (supplying the 
economic analysis). 
 128. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 14. 
 129. Id. at 17. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 17–20. In fact, singer/songwriter Joni Mitchell reportedly wrote her 
famous lyric “they paved paradise and put up a parking lot” while visiting Waikiki 
in 1972. Id. at 17. 
 132. RICHARD F. DYE & RICHARD W. ENGLAND, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, 
ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LAND VALUE TAXATION 14 (2010). 
 133. Oates & Schwab, Impact of Urban Land Taxation, supra note 122, at 8–9. 
However, at the time, the national housing market was in a building slump, so even 
a slight increase in residential construction is worth noting. Id. 
 134. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 17. 
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Yet there are three reasons why it is safe to make this 
assumption. One reason is that most, if not all, of the jurisdictions 
discussed in this section adopted or used land value taxation with a 
specific goal in mind—either to promote tourism, revitalize a 
downtown business district, or spur economic development 
generally—and, in almost every case, the tax successfully achieved 
that goal.135 Thus, if a government adopted land value taxation 
intending to increase rental housing production, it stands to reason 
that it could achieve that goal by assessing the tax in a way that 
favors dense residential building.136 A second reason is that rental 
units are income-producing properties and so would naturally be 
attractive development options for landowners seeking to offset 
their increased tax burdens. The third reason is that municipal 
zoning ordinances often prohibit commercial building in residential 
zones, so owners of vacant or underdeveloped lots zoned for 
residential use would be compelled to construct residential 
structures. Some of these structures would undoubtedly be 
multifamily units.137 In sum, it seems likely that cities would see an 
increase in the number of rental units by switching to a land value 
tax regime, which would reduce the pressures of demand on supply 
and thus lead to more affordable housing for low- and middle-
income renters. 
B. Consequences of Adopting Land Value Taxation and How 
to Mitigate Them 
While land value taxation can be used to positively impact the 
lives of renters nationwide, there are three groups that the tax may 
negatively impact: homeowners, manufactured home residents, and 
independent (“family”) farmers. These groups stand to be harmed 
because they either own large tracts of underdeveloped land, as is 
usually the case with homeowners and independent farmers, or rent 
the land upon which they live from landlords who would be 
incentivized under a land value tax regime to convert the land to a 
different use, as is usually the case with manufactured home 
 
 135. See generally id. at 11–25 (comparing land value taxes in Pennsylvania and 
Hawaii). 
 136. For example, landowners could have their land tax rates reduced so long as 
they developed and operated a multifamily housing complex on the parcel burdened 
by the tax. However, should the complex be demolished or converted to a use other 
than multifamily, the rate would be adjusted back to its original level. In this way, 
the land value tax would encourage development of land generally, but housing 
development specifically. 
 137. Of course, this could not happen on lots zoned for single-family use, which 
indicates why zoning reform is necessary to create more affordable housing. 
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residents. The impacts on these groups, to the extent that they will 
occur at all under a land value tax system, can and should be 
mitigated or, if possible, avoided altogether. 
i. Homeowners 
Because land value taxation incentivizes greater intensity of 
land use, it naturally favors multifamily housing over single-family 
housing and thus benefits renters rather than homeowners.138 
However, even though homeowners, on average, tend to be 
wealthier than renters and are thus less likely to face affordability 
challenges,139 it remains the case that many homeowners are cost-
burdened.140 Insofar as the purpose of enacting a land value tax is 
to create more affordable housing generally, it would be 
counterproductive for housing to become less affordable as a result 
of adopting the tax. Nonetheless, a switch to a land value tax regime 
would likely not unduly burden homeowners for two reasons. First, 
land taxes increase with land values, and single-family properties 
are typically—although not always—located in less urban, lower-
value areas.141 Therefore, single-family properties would likely face 
lower land taxes than buildings located in more urban, higher-value 
areas. Second, because higher taxes on land values would be 
accompanied by lower taxes on building values, most single-family 
homeowners would likely see their actual property tax payment 
either decrease, remain the same, or increase by a negligible 
amount.142 Thus, land value taxation, while certainly more 
 
 138. See discussion supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
 139. In 2016, the median net worth of a homeowner was $231,400, whereas the 
median net worth of a renter or non-homeowner was $5,200. Jesse Bricker, Lisa J. 
Dettling, Alice Henriques, Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B. Moore, Sarah 
Pack, John Sabelhaus, Jeffrey Thompson & Richard A. Windle, Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 13 (2017). 
 140. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31. 
 141. See Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an American 
Ideal: A House With a Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/upshot/cities-across-america-
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is where people tend to own homes. See R. Pendall, Do Land-Use Controls Cause 
Sprawl?, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. B 555, 556 (1999) (discussing land value in suburban 
areas and observing the general principle that “more sprawl occurs where land 
values are lower”). 
 142. Ultimately, however, the actual amount of property tax paid by homeowners 
under a land value tax regime will depend on their land intensity, which is the land 
 
504 Law & Inequality [Vol. 39: 2 
favorable to apartment-building, does not necessarily make 
homeowning more costly. 
However, while it is unlikely that very many homeowners will 
be negatively affected by a switch to land value taxation, one group 
of homeowners deserves special consideration: those who are asset-
rich but cash-poor.143 These individuals tend to be those who 
purchased a home long ago for a low price and saw that home’s 
value greatly appreciate over the following years.144 Still, their 
wages failed to appreciate at the same rate, leaving them with 
considerable housing wealth but little to no liquid assets.145 Even 
though these types of homeowners are arguably not presently cost-
burdened, they may become cost-burdened under a land value tax 
system if the increase to their property tax payment is more than 
they are presently able to pay.146 One way to avoid this issue is to 
grandfather these individuals into their previous property tax 
payments until death or the property is sold.147 Another way is to 
introduce land value taxation with a lower split rate that gradually 
increases over a period of time.148 Lastly, just like how many 
jurisdictions allow veterans, senior citizens, and disabled 
individuals to defer all or part of their property tax payments,149 a 
deferral category could be created for those who are unable to pay 
their property tax because of undue burden.150 Thus, while land 
value taxation does have the potential to harm these types of 
homeowners, this harm is not inevitable and can be mitigated or 
eliminated. 
 
value divided by the total value (land value plus building value). What this generally 
means is that less intensely developed parcels are more likely to see a tax increase, 
while the opposite is true for more intensely developed lots. For a study of how 
different classes of homeowners would be impacted under a land value tax regime, 
see DYE & ENGLAND, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, supra note 132, at 28–30. 
 143. PETER HULSEMAN, ADAM ROVANG, DEVIN BALES & HOANG THE NGUYEN, NW. 
ECON. RES. CTR., LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: SIMULATING THE TAX IN MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY 28 (2019). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 28–29. 
 148. Id. at 29. For example, instead of assessing a 70/30 or 90/10 land-to-building 
value ratio, the first year of implementation could begin with a 55/45 or 60/40 land-
to-building value ratio. This rate would then slowly increase over the following years, 
which would ease the harshness of the impact on these types of homeowners. 
 149. See GILLILAND, supra note 73, at 2. 
 150. HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 29. 
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ii. Manufactured Home Residents 
Manufactured home residents may either be burdened or 
benefited under a land value tax system depending on whether their 
home is assessed as real or personal property. While states 
generally differ in how they classify manufactured homes,151 most 
states treat manufactured homes as personal property for 
assessment purposes unless the resident owns the land on which 
the home is situated.152 Because the vast majority of manufactured 
home residents own the land upon which their home is located,153 
they likely pay both building and land taxes, and thus would be 
affected by a land value tax system in the same way that owners of 
site-built homes would be affected.154 In contrast, roughly one-
fourth of manufactured home residents do not own the land on 
which their home is situated,155 so a land value tax system would 
largely affect them in the same way that it would affect renters 
generally.156 However, an essential difference between multifamily 
housing and manufactured housing is that multifamily housing is a 
relatively intensive land use, while manufactured housing is not. 
For manufactured home residents who rent rather than own their 
land, this distinction makes little difference as far as rental rates 
are concerned, because landlords cannot pass higher land taxes onto 
their tenants.157 Still, the distinction does make a difference in a 
 
 151. Burkhart, supra note 34, at 442–45. 
 152. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 320.015 (2020) (“A mobile home is to be considered real 
property only when the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on 
which the mobile home is situated and said mobile home is permanently affixed 
thereto.”); WIS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX GUIDE FOR MANUFACTURED AND 
MOBILE HOME OWNERS 6 (2020) (stating that a manufactured home can only be 
considered personal property if it is situated on land owned by someone other than 
the homeowner). But see IDAHO CODE § 63-303 (2016) (“Manufactured homes shall 
be assessed as other residential housing . . . .”). 
 153. See Julia O. Beamish, Rosemary C. Goss, Jorge H. Atiles & Youngjoo Kim, 
Not a Trailer Anymore: Perceptions of Manufactured Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y 
DEBATE 373, 381 (2001) (finding that 93% of double-section and 73% of single-section 
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 154. See discussion supra note 142 and accompanying text (observing single-
family homeowners would likely see their actual property tax payment either 
decrease, remain the same, or increase by a negligible amount). 
 155. Beamish et al., supra note 153, at 381. 
 156. See discussion supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text (noting under a 
land value regime, landlords will be less likely to shift their taxes onto their tenants 
through charging higher rents). 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 111–113; Oates & Schwab, Simple 
Analytics, supra note 81, at 57. 
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landlord’s decision about whether to let their land continue in its 
current use or redevelop it for a more intensive use. What this 
means is that, under a land value tax regime, a landlord is more 
likely to redevelop their land when a manufactured home resident 
is renting it than when it is already being used to provide site-built 
multifamily rental housing. However, governments can avoid this 
undesirable outcome by completely exempting land that is being 
rented for manufactured home use from the increased land tax. 
Exempting land should not be problematic because manufactured 
homes located on leased land are typically assessed as personal 
property and thus are not charged a building tax. Therefore, 
governments would not lose revenue by exempting these types of 
homes from the higher land tax; they would simply not gain more 
revenue. 
iii. Independent Farmers 
Because land value taxation disfavors low-density 
development,158 independent farmers stand to be hit the hardest by 
a land value tax system, as farms typically encompass many acres 
of unimproved land. Yet “[f]arms provide value without full 
development”159 and so even though it is the intention of land value 
taxation to encourage landowners to free up unused or underused 
land for development, it would generally be unwise to create a 
system that makes farm operation impossible, inefficient, or at the 
very least, highly difficult.160 Therefore, in order to avoid the 
hardship that farmers could theoretically face under a land value 
tax system, farms could be excluded from the system entirely and 
instead taxed at whatever rate was assessed under the previous 
system.161 Alternatively, farms could be “given a current use 
 
 158. See discussion supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
 159. HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 28. 
 160. But see Alanna Hartzok, Pennsylvania Farmers and the Split-Rate Tax, in 
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households. See ASHOK K. MISHRA, HISHAM S. EL-OSTA, MITCHELL J. MOREHART, 
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2021] Ain't No Taxing High Enough 507 
exemption that allows them to continue to operate without undue 
tax burden.”162 Ultimately, however, because farms tend to be 
located in rural areas where land is not highly valued, there is 
reason to believe that many farms, and specifically those with 
proportionately higher building-to-land ratios, would not be 
drastically affected by a land value tax—or even affected at all.163 
Conclusion 
As America’s affordable housing crisis has worsened, local 
governments have begun to look inwards and reform some of the 
very laws and policies responsible for leading us here.164 Yet the 
single-rate property tax regime, which has contributed significantly 
to that crisis by restricting rental housing supplies, has so far gone 
undetected and thus has managed to avoid the same fate as single-
family zoning.165 Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
land value taxation is an effective tool for freeing up land for 
development and creating more units for the renters who seek 
them. Thus, switching to a land value taxation is the next step that 
local governments should take to combat the nation’s growing 
affordable rental housing crisis. 
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